Book I: Infancy
If the school that punished a mistake in pronunciation hardly noticed the hatred between neighbors, what does that say about the real hierarchy of values it taught, alongside the one it professed?
Augustine weeps for Dido and does not weep for his own death: what does he say about what literature does with compassion, and how far does the critique also apply to the one who writes?
The book states that free curiosity teaches better than fear, and that no one does good out of obligation, and at the same time that God made use of obligation for his good: can these claims fit together?
Book II: The Theft of the Pears
If what Augustine loved in the theft was the company, and not the fruit, what still separates his evil from that of someone who sins for gain?
Augustine's parents want his good, and yet they leave him without a curb: what does the book say each one saw, and what did each fail to see?
If he says he would not have done it alone, to whom does the blame for what he did with the group belong?
Book III: Carthage and the Hortensius
Hortensius kindles in Augustine the love of wisdom, but the name of Christ is absent, and the sect that has the name on its lips does not satisfy him: what makes a content capable of holding a desire that the name alone does not hold?
He says he loved the pain of the theater, and then separates the pain that charity approves from the pain that one loves: at what point does the compassion the spectator feels stop being mercy and become taste?
Monica corrects her son about the dream without hesitation, and the bishop dismisses her with a phrase of hope: what does the book show of a faith that sustains nine years of waiting without being able to argue with the son?
Book IV: The Death of the Friend
If the grief over the loss of a friend springs from the same love that gave joy while he was alive, why does the grief seem greater and longer-lasting than the joy was, and what does this teach about where one should not place one's rest?
The friend from Thagaste refuses Augustine's mockery and dies before the two can talk. What did Augustine lose in his death: the companion, or the chance to be corrected by him?
Augustine tells that he loved Hierius for others' praise and not for what he was. In what cases do we love someone, or an idea, for what is said about them?
Book V: Faustus and the Departure for Rome
Augustine expects from Faustus what the other Manichees could not give, and he is surprised by the confession of ignorance: what does the book show to be worth more than the answer he was looking for?
Monica prays that her son not leave, and Augustine says that God did not grant what she asked in order to grant what she had always asked: what does this way of reading the scene reveal about what he knows and what he could not yet know?
Augustine goes to Ambrose as a critic of rhetoric and comes away with the content as well: what, in the book, shows that form and truth separate under the rule of ch. 6 and join in the experience of ch. 14?
Book VI: Ambrose, Alypius and Ambition
What changes in a culture, and in a way of thinking, when reading stops being a shared voice in a group and becomes silence alone between the reader and the page?
Augustine keeps the promise of marriage for two years and, in the meantime, changes companions out of habit and not out of love: what does this distance between knowing what is right and wanting what is right show about the rest of the book?
Augustine accepts that he believes what he has not seen in almost everything in life, but he refuses that rule for Scripture: where does the difference lie between demanding demonstration and refusing trust?
Book VII: The Books of the Platonists
If the Platonists already know that the Word is God and that it illumines every man, what exactly is missing from this doctrine to be the faith Augustine seeks, and not merely a correct metaphysics?
If evil is not a substance but a deviation of the will, who is responsible for it: the world God created, or the one who chooses to turn away from the good?
Augustine sees the unchangeable light and cannot sustain his gaze: why is seeing the truth not enough to live in it?
Book VIII: The Conversion in the Garden
Augustine says that ordering the will to will is not enough to make it will; what else must there be for the order to be carried out?
The conversion of Victorinus, that of Antony, and that of Augustine happen in different ways: what does each one require of the one who decides?
Does the voice that says "take and read" decide the episode, or does it only give Augustine the gesture he already expected?
Book IX: Ostia and the Death of Monica
Why does Monica, who cared so much about the tomb beside her husband, stop caring about it precisely after saying that nothing holds her to life any longer?
Augustine holds back his weeping out of conviction and then confesses it before God: what does the book suggest that doctrine can and cannot ask of someone who has lost another?
If the ecstasy at Ostia lasts only a stroke of the heart and returns to the noise of the mouth, what does it teach the one who tells it and the one who reads it?
Book X: Memory
Augustine says he remembers the old joy and fear without feeling them again: what changes between living an affection and keeping it, and what does that make possible for someone who confesses in writing?
If everyone wants to be happy, and no one would desire what they did not know, what must a desire know beforehand in order to be a desire, and where would that knowledge be?
Of the three temptations, pride is the one Augustine cannot measure, because he would feel the weight of praise only when it was missing, and to be deprived of it on purpose would require living badly: how can one examine an appetite that reveals itself only in an absence that cannot be provoked?
Book XI: Time
Augustine prefers to say he does not know rather than answer with a joke that consoles many: what is gained, and what is lost, by confessing ignorance before a question too big?
If past and future exist only as memory and expectation, what is common, and what is different, between remembering one's own childhood and waiting for tomorrow?
Augustine says his life is distension and that he seeks to be extended and not distended: in what moments of the life of the one who reads does time feel scattered, and in which does it feel gathered in?
Book XII: The Heaven of Heaven and the Readings of Genesis
If two readings of the same text are both true, what still gives one of them the right to say "the author did not mean this"?
What changes in the way of reading when one admits that one does not know what the author thought, but one does know what is true?
How does the love of one's own reading differ from the love of truth, and how does one tell the two apart in oneself?
Book XIII: Creation Read in the Church
If the creature becomes light only by turning to the light that kindles it, what does the book mean by rest: the end of desire or its place?
Augustine says that several true readings fit the same verse, but also that each one's reading is not worth as a possession. Where, in the book, does he draw the line between the two things?
The book ends with a plea and a door, not with an answer. What changes for the reader if the work ends this way and not with a conclusion?
The Whole Work
If the two wills are both his, who exactly resists whom in Book VIII?
Memory keeps forgetting. Is this a paradox to be solved, or the demonstration that interiority does not close in on itself?
If time is measured in the soul, what happened before there was a soul to measure it?
Augustine holds that several true readings of the same text can be true at the same time. How far does this go, and where does it stop being valid?
Why does a man who tells his own life write it entirely addressed to God, who already knows it, and not to the reader who does not?