Clavis Libri

Symbol

The Palaces of Memory

What It Is

The palaces of memory are the image with which Augustine describes, in Book X, the inside of memory itself: fields and vast palaces where lie the treasures of countless images brought in by the senses, and, deeper still, what came in through no sense at all. It is a place with its own extent and architecture, which he traverses as one climbs a stair, and which does not fit whole inside the one who possesses it.

Ancient rhetoric taught how to keep speeches by placing the images of what one wished to remember in the places of an imagined building, and Cicero describes it in the De oratore.

The book does not speak of this tradition, but the image recalls it, turned inward: Augustine does not ask how to memorize better, but what memory itself is, the thing that holds all this.

Where It Appears

The image belongs to Book X, chs. 8 to 26. The book begins with the question of one who knows himself only in part, and Augustine climbs by steps, passing the power that animates the body and the power that senses, which horses and mules also have, until he reaches memory:

Before examining memory, Augustine describes the act of entering it as one who climbs a stair and arrives at a physical place, with its own extent and architecture. venio in campos et lata praetoria memoriae, ubi sunt thesauri innumerabilium imaginum de cuiuscemodi rebus sensis invectarum (10.8.12), I come into the fields and the vast halls of memory, where lie the storehouses of countless images, brought in from things of every kind perceived by the senses.
Book X: Memory

Astonishment grows in the same ch. 8, up to the most quoted formulation in the book:

Astonishment grows to the most quoted formulation in the book: memory is greater than the mind that possesses it, and Augustine himself does not contain the whole of what he is. magna ista vis est memoriae, magna nimis, deus meus, penetrale amplum et infinitum. quis ad fundum eius pervenit? et vis est haec animi mei atque ad meam naturam pertinet, nec ego ipse capio totum quod sum (10.8.15), great is this power of memory, very great, my God, a spacious and infinite inner sanctum. Who has reached its bottom? And this power is my mind's and belongs to my nature, and I myself do not grasp all that I am.
Book X: Memory

Chs. 9 to 12 distinguish what memory keeps: of the liberal arts and of numbers, the things themselves, without image and without the bodily door through which they entered:

In passing from sensory perceptions to what was learned by study, Augustine marks a difference that structures the rest of the book: in this case memory keeps not a copy but the thing itself. hic sunt et illa omnia quae de doctrinis liberalibus percepta nondum exciderunt, quasi remota interiore loco non loco; nec eorum imagines, sed res ipsas gero (10.9.16), here too are all the things of the liberal arts that I have learned and that have not yet been lost, as if placed in an inner place that is not a place; and I carry no images of them, but the things themselves.
Book X: Memory

This recalls Plato's reminiscence, but Book X does not propose a previous life of the soul: the text says only that the notions were already in memory, far back, before they were learned. Of the affections, in chs. 13 to 15, it keeps the notion without the disturbance, as the belly keeps food without its taste:

nimirum ergo memoria quasi venter est animi, laetitia vero atque tristitia quasi cibus dulcis et amarus: cum memoriae commendantur, quasi traiecta in ventrem recondi illic possunt, sapere non possunt (10.14.21), undoubtedly, memory is like the belly of the spirit, and joy and sorrow are like sweet and bitter food: when entrusted to memory, they pass, so to speak, into the belly and can be kept there, but they cannot have flavor.
Book X: Memory

Ch. 16 poses the finest riddle: to recognize the word forgetting one must remember it, yet what forgetting does is erase the memory.

Chapter 16 reaches the most elegant problem of the book: how is it possible to remember forgetting, if to remember something is the opposite of having forgotten it? sed quid est oblivio nisi privatio memoriae? quomodo ergo adest ut eam meminerim, quando cum adest meminisse non possum (10.16.24), but what is forgetting except the privation of memory? How, then, is it present so that I may remember it, when, while it is present, I cannot remember?
Book X: Memory

In ch. 17, he decides to pass through memory too, and the argument stumbles on its own path:

si praeter memoriam meam te invenio, immemor tui sum. et quomodo iam inveniam te, si memor non sum tui (10.17.26), if I find you outside my memory, I am not mindful of you. And how shall I find you, if I am not mindful of you?
Book X: Memory

The way out comes in chs. 24 to 26: God was not in memory before he was learned, and Augustine finds him above himself:

neque enim iam eras in memoria mea, priusquam te discerem. ubi ergo te inveni ut discerem te, nisi in te supra me (10.26.37), for you were not yet in my memory before I learned you. Where, then, did I find you so as to learn you, if not in you, above me?
Book X: Memory

Book X echoes Book IV, ch. 4, where, with the death of his friend, Augustine had already become a great question to himself:

This is the emotional peak of the part. A childhood friend, baptized without his consent during a fever, reacts with horror when Augustine tries to mock the baptism he received unconsciously; a few days later, he dies. quo dolore contenebratum est cor meum, et quidquid aspiciebam mors erat [...] factus eram ipse mihi magna quaestio (4.4.9), with that grief my heart was darkened, and whatever I looked at was death [...] I had become a great question to myself.
Book IV: The Death of the Friend

And the book opens with the opposite of memory, by telling what he does not remember: in Book I, chs. 6 and 7, Augustine reconstructs the infant from other infants and from what he was told, and memory only begins later.

Book XI takes up the instrument again. What in X was a place with palaces becomes, in XI, an act of the mind measuring time. In ch. 20, past and future exist only as presents in the soul, and memory is the present of things past:

If past and future can only be as presents, strictly speaking there are not three times, there are three presents in the soul. tempora sunt tria, praesens de praeteritis, praesens de praesentibus, praesens de futuris.' sunt enim haec in anima tria quaedam et alibi ea non video, praesens de praeteritis memoria, praesens de praesentibus contuitus, praesens de futuris expectatio (11.20.26), there are three times: a present of things past, a present of things present, a present of things future. For these three are in the soul, and elsewhere I do not see them: the present of things past is memory, the present of things present is direct sight, the present of things future is expectation.
Book XI: Time

In ch. 27, what is measured is what has remained fixed in memory, and not the things that no longer are:

What is measured is what remains. non ergo ipsas quae iam non sunt, sed aliquid in memoria mea metior, quod infixum manet (11.27.35), so it is not those things, which no longer are, that I measure, but something in my memory that remains fixed.
Book XI: Time

In ch. 28, the example is reciting a known hymn, in which memory is stretched over what has already been said and expectation over what is still to come:

Reciting a hymn is enough to see time take shape in the mind. dicturus sum canticum quod novi. antequam incipiam, in totum expectatio mea tenditur, cum autem coepero, quantum ex illa in praeteritum decerpsero, tenditur et memoria mea, atque distenditur vita huius actionis meae in memoriam propter quod dixi et in expectationem propter quod dicturus sum (11.28.38), I am about to recite a hymn that I know. Before I begin, my expectation is stretched over the whole; but when I begin, as much of it as I pluck off into the past is stretched also in my memory, and the life of this action of mine is stretched out into memory because of what I have said, and into expectation because of what I am about to say.
Book XI: Time

What It Means

The palaces are the image of an interiority without visible bottom. Augustine describes it as a place so that it can be traversed, and the conclusion he draws is that it exceeds the one who possesses it: the spirit does not fit whole within itself. It is this lack of a bottom that lets memory host God without becoming God, because a finite space could not contain what he is going to describe, and that is why, when he passes into memory, he discovers it as the place of God's presence.

Book XI dismantles what Book X built, without contradicting it. What seemed a room with storerooms shows itself to be a function: memory is one of the three ways in which the mind has time, alongside sight and expectation. The palace gives the measure of astonishment, and the hymn gives the measure of the process; in the whole life, as XI says at the end, memory is what keeps dispersal from becoming loss.

The text supports two readings of the passage from X to XI. In one there is continuity: the same memory that kept the images, the affections and the things themselves is the present of things past that XI places at the center of the measure of time. In the other there is a rupture of image: what was a space with rooms becomes distention, and the gesture is that of someone who recognizes that the space was a way of speaking, useful for astonishment and insufficient for time. The book does not choose, and what it leaves is an image that serves only as long as the reader knows it is an image.

Relationships

  • Standard themes: Memory and the Past, Time, Knowledge and Wisdom, God and the Divine.
  • Characters: Augustine.
  • Neighboring symbols: the window at Ostia, where the conversation goes from the minds to Wisdom.