Chapter summary
Machiavelli starts from a list of precautions that princes usually take to preserve the state: disarming subjects, keeping the subject territories divided, nourishing enmities against themselves, winning over those who were suspect at the start, building fortresses or razing them. He warns that all this cannot be judged in general.
First, subjects' arms. A new prince has never disarmed his own: when he found them unarmed, he armed them. Armed, the suspect become faithful, the faithful remain so and all become partisans. Since not everyone can receive arms, those who receive them are made debtors, and the others excuse the difference. To disarm is to offend: it shows distrust, from cowardice or little faith, and that breeds hatred. The exception is the new state joined to the old: there the conquered people are disarmed, except for those who declared for the prince at the conquest, and even those are softened with time, so that all arms remain with the soldiers of the old state.
Next, divisions. The ancients used to say that Pistoia was held by factions and Pisa by fortresses. Machiavelli answers that this served when Italy was in balance and does not serve today: when the enemy approaches, the divided city is lost, because the weaker faction joins the foreigner. The Venetians nourished Guelfs and Ghibellines in the subject cities, without letting them come to blood; defeated at Vailà, they saw one of the factions take heart and take the whole state from them.
Then, enemies and the suspect. Princes make themselves great by overcoming oppositions, and fortune, when she wants to make a new prince great, causes enemies to arise for him so that he may climb "by that ladder." Those who were suspect at the start serve better than those trusted, as Pandolfo Petrucci of Siena shows, who governed more with them: they must wipe out the bad reputation by their deeds. But whoever took the state with help from people inside must see why they helped him: if it was only through discontent, it will be impossible to satisfy them.
Finally, fortresses. They are useful or not, according to the times: Niccolò Vitelli demolished two in Città di Castello; Guidobaldo, duke of Urbino, razed all those of his territory on his return, after being expelled by Cesare Borgia; the Bentivoglio did the same in Bologna. The castle of Milan made more war on the House of Sforza than any other disorder. The countess of Forlì saved herself by a fortress when Count Girolamo, her husband, was killed, but afterward, attacked by Borgia, saw the people, her enemy, join the foreigner. Machiavelli's rule: whoever fears the people more than foreigners should build them, and whoever fears foreigners more should leave them aside. And the best fortress is not to be hated.
Analysis
The title. It looks like a question from a manual of fortification, but it is a question about the prince's fear: whom does he distrust, and what price does he pay for it. The fortress is only the last of the five expedients on the list, and the title warns that the answer holds for "many other things" that princes do from habit. Machiavelli does not want a yes or a no, he wants a criterion.
What Machiavelli shows here is that no traditional precaution is worth anything in itself: it is worth what it is according to whether the prince is new or old, at peace or at war, and above all according to whether the people love him or hate him. Arming subjects brings the prince closer to them, dividing cities pays only in peace, and fortresses help one who fears the people and hinder one who has offended them. The defense that remains in the end, when the others fail, is not to be hated.
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